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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff and Appellee. ]|
vs.

]

WAYNE WARDLE,

]1

Case No. 890372-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant and Appellant. '

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Defendant, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 35, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, hereby petitions the Court for
rehearing on the grounds and for the reasons that this Court (The
Honorable Norman H. Jackson [presiding], Regnal W. Garff, and J.
Robert Bullock) was not afforded the opportunity of reviewing the
Reply Brief which Defendant timely served on March 2, 1990, and has
overlooked or misapprehended certain issues of law and fact which
were addressed in the Reply Brief.
attached as Addendum "A".

A copy of the Slip Opinion is

A copy of the Reply Brief is attached

hereto as Addendum "B" and the legal authorities cited therein are
incorporated by this reference.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Following a review of the decision on appeal, counsel
contacted the clerk's office on June 18, 1990, to determine whether
or not the Court had in fact received the Defendant's Reply Brief.
Counsel was advised by Sheri Knighton, deputy clerk, that the clerk
1

had in fact received the Reply Brief but stated that the brief had
never been docketed nor copies distributed to the judges for review
in connection with the decision in the case.
2.

The

Court

has

overlooked

or misapprehended

the

following points of law and fact:
a. The Court apparently concluded that the prosecutor's
alternative fraud theory was supported by competent evidence and
that, therefore, the alternative theory was not used merely as a
"vehicle for prejudicing the defendant."

Slip Opinion at p.4.

Accordingly, the prosecutor's insurance fraud theory and argument
based on the inflation of the proof-of-loss statement was not
objectionable nor trial counsel's failure to object thereto indicia
of /^effective

representation.

Slip

Opinion

at

p.6.

These

conclusions completely overlook the fact that the evidence offered
in support of the alternative

fraud theory was objectionable

hearsay and, although admitted without objection, would not have
supported a conviction based on the alternative theory. This issue
is briefed at pages 2 through 5 of the Reply Brief.
b. Unfair and prejudicial impeachment is not limited to
examination

involving

inquiries

relating

to

prior

criminal

convictions.

This point is briefed at pages 6 through 8 of the

Reply Brief.

The Court's opinion overlooks or misapprehends the

law on this issue or the facts surrounding the issue.
c. The Court concludes that the line of questioning
regarding

prior

civil

judgments

was

not

prejudicial

to the

Defendant because "he admitted having five or six civil judgments
2

against him."

Slip Opinion at p . 4 .

The Defendant admitted having

"probably f i v e or si x judgments aga I nst me through m y history. H
When asked specifically about outstanding judgments

*r* T9P6 the

Defendant testified that he did not recall whether or not he had
any

judgments

against

him

at

t] lat

ti me

bi it acini i tted

tl lat he

probably had "a couple" and specifically identified a judgment in
favor oi Western General Dairies

in the amount of $762 and a

judgment in favor of Conlee Company iii 'he did -urit ot
Thousand ($5,000 or $6,000) Dollars."

(T. 3 5 4 - 3 5 5 ) .

"Five inx; Six
In concluding

that the questions regarding civil judgments against the Defendant
were proper inquiry concerning the Defendant's fi nancial sta tus and
provided a motive for arson and insurance fraud, the Court failed
to

recognize

the

fact

that

the

Defendant

conceded

only

two

judgments against him during a time frame which would have any
relevance

to the

appreciate the
his

business

issue of motive.

The Court

also

failed

to

fact that the Defendant steadfastly denied changing
name

and

bank

accounts

or changing

the

form

of

business organization for the purpose of avoiding creditors and
that the prosecutor failed to offer any ev i (lei ice In support of
innuendo created through his cross-examination.

the

Again, this issue

is briefed at pages 6 through 8 of the Reply Brief.
c,

error to insti net

t; lie jui y that, a reasonable

doubt must be a "real, substantial doubt, not one that is merely
possible or imaginary."

The error was preserved for review by

trial Lounse I " i- except ion in tin.1 'lisi-fi- I ''Quirt's refusal *•»
the proposed "reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction.
3

qwe

This

issue was briefed at page 27 of the Appellant's Brief and pages 9
through 11 of the Reply Brief which cited and quoted from State v.
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989).

The prejudical effect of the

"possible or imaginary" language is more pronounced in this case
because, unlike Ireland, the instant case is based strictly on
circumstance.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that
the rehearing should be granted so as to allow the Court the
opportunity to reevaluate its decision in light of the authorities
provided by way of Defendant's Reply Brief.
DATED this 20th day of June, 1990.
Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Defendant
STATE OF UTAH

)
SS.
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON)
Gary W. Pendleton, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says that he is the above named and is an attorney, licensed to
practice law in the State of Utah; that he has read the foregoing
document and knows the contents thereof and hereby verifies that
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing is filed in good faith and not
for the purpose of delay and that the same is true of his own

4

knowledge except as to those matters therein stated on information
and belief, and as to those he believes them to be true.

hi
Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Defendant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20th day of June,
1990.
/ * /

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at St. George, Utah
My Commission Expires: 5/31/1994

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on this 2flth day of June, 1990,
I did personally mail four true and correct copies of the above and
foregoing document to R. Paul Van Dan, Utah Attorney General at 236
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.

hi

Gary W. Pendleton
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State of Utah,

__ooooo~~

Plaintiff and Appellee,

cA^$lm&.
** Court

OPINION
(Not For Publication)

v.
Wayne Wardle,

Case No. 890372-CA

Defendant and Appellant-

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Frank G. Noel
Attorneys:

Gary Pendleton, St. George, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Garff, Jackson, and Bullock.1
JACKSON, Judge:
Wayne Wardle appeals his jury convictions of aggravated
arson, a first-degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-103 (1990)/ and insurance fraud, a second-degree felony
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1990). We affirm.
Wardle raises five issues on appeal: (1) insufficiency
of the evidence; (2) denial of due process; (3) improper expert
testimony; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (5)
refusal of jury instruction.
Wardle owned and operated A-l Maintenance in an old home
in Murray, Utah. He was at the business for one-half hour the
morning of October 20, 1986. About thirty minutes after he
departed, the Murray City fire department was dispatched to the

1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10)
(Supp. 1989).

business. The firefighters arrived four minutes later and
found the building ablaze.
Investigators agreed that the point of origin of the fire
was adjacent to Wardle*s desk in his office area. They
discovered a soldering iron next to his desk that had been
burning for several days and had penetrated the carpet, pad and
one-half inch into the underlying particle board. The burn
pattern around the iron was consistent with the use of an
accelerant, such as flammable liquid. Tests revealed the
presence of a light range hydrocarbon, an accelerant, in the
carpet. Investigators concluded that the fire was
intentionally set. They concluded that the iron would not
ignite flames without the aid of an accelerant or manipulation
of a garbage bag to create a bellows effect. All investigators
agreed that, on that morning, Wardle could not have avoided
seeing or smelling the burning produced by the iron.
Wardle1s building was insured for $30,000. His one-year
policy became effective three months prior to the fire. The
insurance
claims investigator described the building as a
M
shack" that could have been replaced for about $13,000. After
the fire, Wardle says he was not too concerned about the
building because he was planning to demolish it anyway, which
he did for $450. He said he had received bids for demolition
at $1,700-$1,800 and had a loan for a new building. He also
stated that the fire did not affect his ability to continue in
business because it was his off-season and there was little
equipment or furnishings in the building.
Wardle retained a public adjustor to prepare an insurance
claim and filed his claim for $24,984.75. Wardle signed the
proof of loss statement. The claim was settled for $15,900.
We will examine the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the guilty verdicts on both charges. When reviewing a
claim that the evidence was insufficient, we must view the
evidence and all inferences that may be drawn from it in the
light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d
116, 117 (Utah 1989). If there is evidence from which the jury
could have found all the elements of the crime, our inquiry
must stop and the conviction must be affirmed. State v.
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).
First, we will examine the evidence supporting the
verdict of aggravated arson. Section 76-6-103(1) provides in
relevant part:

a person is guilty of aggravated arson if
by means of fire or explosives he
intentionally and unlawfully damages:
(a) a habitable structure!!.]
Three arson investigators examined the cause of the fire: Dean
Larsen, Murray City fire marshall and assistant chief; John
Blundell, at Larsen's request; and James Ashley, at the request
of Wardle*s insurer. Each testified that the fire was
intentionally set. Further, the State chemist's discovery of
hydrocarbon, a fire accelerant, in carpet samples was
consistent with the investigators' determinations that the
carpet burn patterns revealed the use of an accelerant. Wardle
was on the premises shortly before the fire was discovered, and
he was there at his desk when the smoldering soldering iron
could not have been overlooked. The door was locked and Wardle
had the keys. Wardle's only explanation for the fire was that
he must have kicked or moved a paper sack full of garbage onto
the smoldering iron that morning without noticing what he had
done. The jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence
before it that Wardle had intentionally started the fire. We
find sufficient evidence in the record to support Wardle's
conviction of aggravated arson.
Next, we will examine the evidence supporting the verdict
of insurance fraud. Section 76-6-521 provides:
Every person who presents, or causes
to be presented, any false or fraudulent
claim, or any proof in support of any such
claim, upon any contract of insurance for
the payment of any loss, or who prepares,
makes or subscribes any account,
certificate of survey, affidavit or proof
of loss, or other book, paper or writing,
with intent to present or use the same, or
to allow it to be presented or used, in
support of any such claim is punishable as
in the manner prescribed for theft of
property of like value.
Wardle submitted to Ohio Casualty Insurance Company a
"Sworn Statement In Proof of Loss." The statement contains the
following affirmation: "The said loss did not originate by any
act, design or procurement on the part of the insured or this
affiant." The document was duly subscribed and sworn to by
Wardle. The jury, having found Wardle guilty of aggravated
arson, could only conclude that the above affirmation was
false. This evidence alone is sufficient to support Wardle*s
conviction of insurance fraud. Thus, we do not need to

consider the State's claim that evidence of the inflated values
listed in the proof of loss statement was sufficient to support
the insurance fraud conviction.
Wardle framed his due process argument as follows:
"Defendant was denied due process as a result of unwarranted
and prejudicial attacks upon his character and credibility."
His first complaint is that the State inappropriately used the
insurance fraud count as a "vehicle for prejudicing the
defendant." Wardle fails to cite a single authority in support
of this point or to demonstrate that it constitutes a denial of
due process. Wardle1s second due process complaint alleges
unfair prejudice from "unwarranted attacks related to his
financial circumstances." Again, Wardle has not cited any
authorities which mention due process. The only Utah case
cited is State v. Peterson. 722 P.2d 768 (Utah 1986), which is
not on point. That case involved impeachment of a defendant
based on prior criminal convictions. Here, Wardle was not
asked about any prior criminal activity or convictions. He was
asked about some civil judgments bearing on his financial
condition prior to the fire, and he admitted having had five or
six civil judgments against him. Wardle has failed to properly
articulate his due process claim or cite supporting authority
for this argument. We think that it was proper to inquire
about Wardle1s financial status as revealing a motive for arson
and insurance fraud. See People v. Folsom, 220 Cal. App. 2d
809, 34 Cal. Rptr. 148, 150 (1963).
We turn next to Wardle's claim that his conviction was
based on "improper 'expert1 testimony." He complains about the
following testimony: (1) Larsen was asked, "What is your
theory of the case, how did this fire start?" He replied, "My
opinion is that the soldering iron was put there prior to the
actual fire itself; that it smoldered for quite some time
without getting in complete combustion or the fire stage; that
it was discovered by Mr. Wardle and that he accelerated it, put
some type of flammable liquid on it to get it started and then
left." (2) Ashby was asked whether he was "able to form some
kind of theory as to what happened here?" He stated that the
soldering iron was placed on the floor with a bag of garbage on
Thursday, that Wardle went back to investigate, found the bag
slow burning and used something to create an open flame and
left. He believed the smoldering iron "would have been very
noticeable, the smoke, the odor, something, something should
have told Mr. Wardle that things were amiss." (3) Blundell
summarized, "[B]asically what we're saying is that the

890372-CA
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defendant lied about what he found when he walked into the
bull ding that morning because smoke would have been present
Wardle directs us to Utah Rules of Evidence 704 and
the basis for his argument that admission of the above
testimony was "manifest error," Those rules provide:
i \ i i 11«

V I I I il ,

HI )|J i in i n i l

in

ill I r i in a I i > i n p m i .

Testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fart
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence
on ground of prejudice, confusion, or
waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence
excluded if its probative value
substantially outweighed by the danger cf
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issups,
or misleading the jury, or by
consideration of undue delay, waste
time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence,
War <j 1e ar gues t h a t 11 i i s t e s t i m o n y f r o in t h e e x p e i: t s s h o m 1 d
have been excluded because its probative val ue was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues or misleading the jur y. His argument
simply regurgitates the language of the rule, Then he cites
State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), as requiring
reversal of his convictions "based upon the err'^neous and
prejudical admission of expert testimony."2
w a r ai e undertook n o anax>i;I^ oi ^i.i^g^^i. **..
his case, but simply shared a quote from page 3
We remain w arj oi the potuiii.u. ^
evidence to distort the fact-finding
process by reason of its superficial
plausibility and its potential for
inducing fact finders to accept expert
judgment on critical issues rather than
making th* i * '"
2. Besides Rimmasch, Wardle cites only State v. Cobo, 90 Utah
89,
60 P.2d 952, 958 (1936), in support of his claim of
n
mani f e s t e r r o r " b a s e d oi I i niproper expei; t test i m o n y .
c

We note that Rimmasch treats Rules 608(a) and 702, which Wardle
has not mentioned. Wardle argues further that the following
rhetorical question by the prosecutor during closing argument
suggested to the jury "that it may forego independent analysis
of the facts" and decide the case on a single issue:
Do you believe these three arson
investigators when they reached the
conclusion that this was an intentionally
set fire, or do you believe the defendant
when he says it was an accident?
To us, this question sets the issue correctly as one of
credibility. The parties each had a theory concerning the
cause of the fire, i.e., intentional or accidental. The jury
believed the experts and not Wardle. Credibility of witnesses
is a matter for the jury to determine. State v. Baqley, 681
P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984).
Next, Wardle contends his trial counsel was ineffective,
resulting in a denial of his sixth amendment rights. In
evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we must
determine that counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment and that defendant
was prejudiced. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989).
First, Wardle contends that counsel should have objected to
the prosecutor's insurance fraud theory and argument that
Wardle's proof of loss statement was inflated because that
theory was unsupported by the evidence. However, Wardle
ignores testimony that his building was valued at $13,000 and
that he accepted $15,900 after submitting a claim for $25,000.
Further, Wardle testified that he would have been happy to
receive $5,000-$6,000 because he was not sure he had insurance
and that was what he felt his loss was at the time. His proof
of loss statement listed $544 for sheetrock when there was no
sheetrock in the walls that burned. From this evidence, the
prosecutor could properly argue that Wardle believed the value
of his building to be about $6,000 and that his $25,000 claim
was inflated and padded. Thus, an objection to the
prosecutor's argument would not have been well taken. We find
no deficiency in counsel's performance in this regard.

Next, wardle contends that counsel " -.JI . "I.JSS in allowing
the State to introduce, without objection! improper opinion
evidence which was clearly prejudicial to defendant."
Prejudice is established where this Court's confidence in tl le
verdict is undermined because there is a reasonable likelihood
of a different result if counsel had not performed
deficiently- State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988). Assuming arguendo that counsel was deficient in
not objecting to the experts* insertion of Wardle's name i n
their hypotheses as to how the fire started, we find no
prejudice. Wardle was the last known person in the building
prior to the fire. He was there shortly before the fire. An
accelerant was applied to the fire. Wardle*s failure to see or
smell the smoldering iron next to his desk where the fire
originated is inexplicable. We find it highly improbable that
the jury found Wardle guilty because his name was mentioned by
the experts. Wardle*s "accident" explanation placed his
credibility squarely at odds with that of the experts, even
without Blundell's commentary on the divergent testimony.
Because Wardle has not demonstrated prejudice, his conviction
must stand. See State v. Frame, 723 P,2d 401 405 (Utah ] 986).
We have carefully considered Wardle"" s remaining claim
regarding the trial court's failure to cjive HI iury
i nst ruct ion ^ and we conclude i f i s ii'if-i I 1 < i\

3. The brief contains a single page of argument and cites a
single case as follows; "See State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723
(Utah 198.- • ' t inq
rases) ."
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SUMMARY OF ..ARGUMENT
The
unsupported
Defendant

State * s
by a ii]

alternative

competent

w a s prejudiced

fraud

theory

o r persiiasi v e

by

is

completely

evidence

:ross-examination

and

ancj

the

argument

calculated to establish his guilt under such a theory.
Furthermore.

the Defendan I: i ; • as I n i fa :i r] ] preji id I ze ::i ii :i: i

cross-examination by innuendo which was calculated tc • destroy 1 lis
credibility,
F i na ] Il I,. ,

! In

I iirhlpquricy

nI

t lif j

"",

instruction would have been substantially cured haa

-"

> proposed

"reasonable alternative hypothesis" ins* auction be^p civ^n m d the
Defendant 1 i a s preser i e< I h ii EIII :I :i jht 1 ::)
by exceptions taken i n the t ri al con rt.

1

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS AS A RESULT OF
UNWARRANTED AND PREJUDICIAL ATTACKS UPON HIS
CHARACTER AND CREDIBILITY.
The State contends:

"Defendant's

claims of unfair

prejudice rest upon his misleading representation of the facts
presented at trial and his mischaracterization of the crossexamination about his finances as impeachment."
In addressing the

Resp. Br. at 8,

issue involving the alternative

fraud

theory, the State argues that the record contains competent and
persuasive evidence establishing that the Defendant's building "was
not worth more than $13,000."

Resp. Br. at 8.

The testimony to which the State refers follows:
A. [BY MR. JENSEN]
*

*

*

As far as the amount, the amount that was requested
by an independent agent that had coverage through
our company, he set the amount. I think it was
probably an excessive guess, because I think we
have a contractor that looked at it and said he
could have probably rebuilt the building back to
the condition it was in for less than half of what
the insurance was on the building.
Q. He could have rebuilt that particular building
for how much?
A. I think he mentioned right around $13,000.
[Emphasis added]
T. 148-149.
As a general rule, if hearsay evidence is admitted
without objection, it becomes competent evidence admissible for all
2

purposes .
However,

See generally., Ajmril
this

rule

"does

''"I" ' L II"! <M li'll), ttwctiun i ( I % J ) .

not operate

to make

objectionable

testimony conclusi ve proof of the matter asserted therein. T h e
fact tl lat i t: was hearsay • ilc es

i 10 t prevei it its use as proof no I ar

as :i t has probative value, but t .h i s

i s 1 imi ted to the extent of

whatever rationa 1 persuasi ve power it m a y have."
'lilii,,1 III11, "(J / H I

Ml.l

State v

Romero,

I IMI IM ] 960) (reversing a burglary conviction, based

substantially upon hearsay which was admitted without objection).
In S t a t e v . Me Garni „
the defendant
The

only

appealed

proof

that

his conviction
certain

pi ".virlpfl 1 lhi i . Mil jllii h e a r s a y

I

"!(», Ii4l"i II1 ,M HI I l I 4 1 1 ' | ,

I I ? Aim/

MM loui

signatures

counts

were

ut

forgery.

iiiiiMiiiuthorized was

M-^f-iiMii | "I llu-;- ai iiivii t i in, f ln-i 'm i-i-aid

Supreme C o u r t h e l d t h a t where dn e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m i n a l
o f f e n s e was e s t a b l i s h e d

s o l e l y by h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e ,

of

I ufirlaniinit. ii 1

t h e herirsii v

Hil

aa I nr

I'lie a d m i s s i o n

Jiequn i i \u\

i pveifaal ,
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theory.
The mischief created by the introduction of this hearsay
was later compounded by the prosecutor's innuendo suggesting that
the statement regarding the cost of reconstructing the building had
been made by the Defendant himself:
Q. [BY MR. JONES] Is it true it only cost $13,000
to put a new building on the site where the old one
burned down?
A. [BY THE DEFENDANT] That isn't true.
Q. Did you ever tell Mic Jensen that?
A. What?
Q. That it only cost $13,000 to put up a new
building where the old one went down?
A. I think you misunderstood the conversation.
Q. I'm asking you, sir, did you ever tell him that?
A. I don't believe so.
T. 336.
After combing through the Proof of Loss Statement, the
State has come up with what it believes is further evidence of the
inflation of the insurance claim.
The Proof of Loss statement provided in the
appendix of the defendant's brief lists an estimate
of $544 for sheetrock for the office wall, yet,
prior to the fire, there was no sheetrock on the
walls in the area of the office that burned (T.37,
87-88, 104). There was only thin wood paneling
with no sheetrock underneath (T.37).
Resp. Br. at 9.
This is a theory that was never approached by the
prosecutor at trial.

The State would have this Court speculate

concerning the relative cost of restoring the office area with
4

sheetrock walls and the cost of restoring the walls with wood
paneling and from that conjecture find a s u f f i c i e n t

basis

for

arguing the Defendant's g u i l t on the alternative fraud theory.
The

State

concludes

that

the

foregoing

"evidence"

demonstrates the prosecutor's good faith in cross-examination and
argument which suggested that i t was a "cop-out" for the Defendant
to hire a public adjuster to evaluate his loss and criminal for him
to submit a Proof of Loss Statement without personally verifying
each item. 1
In c l o s i n g , the prosecutor argued:
He claims no knowledge about the proof of l o s s , which i s
troubling a l s o .
Here's a man who submits a claim t o t h e
insurance company for $24,900.00, s i g n s i t on t h e bottom
saying i t ' s t r u e , c o r r e c t and accurate, and y e t on t h e stand
yesterday he s a i d : I don't r e a l l y know t o o much about i t , I
hired a couple of public adjustors t o take care of t h e
situation.
Well,
don't
proof
money

that in r e a l i t y i s a cop-out by the Defendant t o say I
know what the p o l i c y i s a l l about, I don't know what the
of l o s s i s a l l about, and y e t I'm going t o r e c e i v e t h a t
from the insurance company.

T. 371.
The State takes a similar position in its brief on appeal. Resp. Br.
at 10.
In fact, under cross-examination, the Defendant testified:
Q. [BY MR. JONES] And it's your testimony to the jury that you
didn't know anything at all about what went into the Proof of
Loss?
A. [BY THE DEFENDANT] No, I read it.
and Loss exactly.

I understand the Proof

Q. Not only did you read it, Mr. Wardle, you signed it?
A. That's correct.
Q. Acknowledging the contents of that Proof of Loss is true
and correct?
A. I believe that it is true and correct.
T. 333.

5

The State attempts to justify the destructive crossexamination on the subject of the Defendant's "financial interest•"
A relevant inquiry would have directly approached the Defendant's
financial condition

at the time of the

fire.

prosecutor chose to paint the Defendant

Instead, the

as dishonest

in his

business dealings and in his denial of the prosecutor's specific
questions for which the jury would surely assume there existed a
good-faith basis.2
The State suggests that the impeaching character of the
inquiry should be disregarded and the prosecutor should not be
required to establish good faith in making the inquiry because the
evidence was
Defendant's

introduced
"financial

for the purpose
interest"

and

impeachment of defendant's credibility."

of

"was

establishing

the

not

for

sought

Resp. Br. at 13.

The State then suggests that the authorities cited by the
Defendant should be distinguished because the impeachment in the
instant case does not arise out of questioning involving prior
felony convictions.

Resp. Br. at 14-15.

Finally, the State attempts to downplay the impact of
this line of questioning and the prosecutor's failure to offer
rebuttal by pointing out that, in his closing

argument, the

prosecutor conceded that he had failed to establish any evidence of
financial motive.

Resp. Br. at 13.

2

"The prosecuting attorney may well be assumed to be a man of fair standing
before the jury; and they may well have thought that he would not have asked the
question unless he could have proved what it intimated if he had been allowed to
do so." People v. Wells, 100 Cal. 459, 462, 34 Pac. 1078, 1079 (1893).

6

State v. Singleton, 66 Ariz. 49, 182 P.2d 920 (1947), was
an appeal from a murder conviction.
defendant's

theory

of

self-defense

The "very heart" of the
lie

reputation for being a peaceable man.

in

establishing

his

On cross-examination, the

prosecutor asked the defendant three times whether or not he had
threatened a third party by the name of Menacey.
defendant denied it.

Three times the

The State contended that

"this line of

questioning was not put to lay the foundation for impeachment, but
was designed to rebut defendant's claim of self defense and on that
basis was both admissible and proper."

182 P.2d at 929.

In

reversing the conviction, the Arizona Supreme Court stated:
[W]hen, as here, such questioning is raised and
then dropped with no further attempt on the part of
the State to prove its point, the aforementioned
"fishing expedition" having failed, we believe it
to be wholly improper and highly prejudicial. To
allow this sort of examination would be to allow
the imaginative and overzealous prosecutor to
concoct a damaging line of examination which could
leave with the jury the impression that defendant
was anything that the questions, by innuendo,
seemed to suggest.
If the questions were
persistent enough and cleverly enough framed, no
amount of denial on the part of a defendant would
be able to erase the impression in the mind of the
jury that the prosecutor actually had such facts at
hand and that probably there was some truth to the
insinuations.
182 P.2d at 930.
The condemnation of innuendo has never been limited to
situations where the tactic is used to imply the existence of a
prior

criminal

record.

See

ABA,

Code

of

Professional

Responsibility DR 7-106(C)(l); ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice
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3-5.7(d);3 6 Wiomore, Evidence, Section 1808(2)(Chadbourn rev.
1976).
No trial lawyer could read pages 342 through 355 of the
transcript and conclude that the mischief introduced thereby was
remedied by the prosecutor's concession that he had failed to
establish a financial motive for the fire.
It has been said that cross-examination is the most
effective machine devised

for getting at the truth.

Cross-

examination by innuendo is the most effective machine devised for
creating the illusion of truth and the illusion of effective
impeachment.

The power of innuendo lies in deception.

suspicion and spawns skepticism.

It breeds

It cuts to the very core of a

defense based primarily upon the accused's credibility.
dangerous

tactic

which

has

no

place

in

It is a

Anglo-American

jurisprudence.
This was trial by innuendo, guilt by impeachment.
POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS NOT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPELLATE
REVIEW OF THE JURY INSTRUCTION ISSUES.
The S t a t e

acknowledges

that

the

Defendant

proposed

a

"reasonable a l t e r n a t i v e hypothesis" i n s t r u c t i o n which t h e d i s t r i c t
court

refused to give.

The S t a t e

3

further

acknowledges

that

the

" I t i s an improper t a c t i c for the prosecutor t o attempt t o communicate
impressions by innuendo through q u e s t i o n s t h a t would be t o t h e defendant's
advantage t o answer in t h e n e g a t i v e , for example, 'Have you ever been convicted
of t h e crime of robbery?' or 'Weren't you a member of t h e Communist p a r t y ? ' or
'Did you t e l l Mr. X t h a t
?' when t h e questioner has no evidence t o support the
innuendo. n Comment, ABA, Standards of Criminal J u s t i c e 3 - 5 . 7 .
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Defendant took exception to the district court's refusal to give
the proposed instruction.

However, the State argues that the

Defendant has waived his right to a review of the adequacy of the
instructions given because trial counsel did not take exception to
the "reasonable doubt" instruction.
recognize

is

that

the

inadequacy

What the State fails to
of

the

"reasonable doubt"

instruction would have been substantially cured had the proposed
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction been given.
The precise deficiency of which Defendant complains was
recognized by Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion in State v.
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1382 (Utah 1989):
Finally, I submit that it is inappropriate to
instruct that a reasonable doubt is not merely a
possibility, as the instruction in this case does.
Possibilities may or may not create doubt.
Depending on the circumstances, a possibility may
constitute a reasonable doubt.
Whether a ^
possibility is sufficient to create a reasonable
doubt depends upon the likelihood
of the
possibility.
Certainly a fanciful or wholly
speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof
beyond reasonable doubt. But the instruction does
not make the point clear.
An instruction that a reasonable doubt must be a
"real, substantial doubt, and not one that is
merely possible or imaginary" has been held to be
erroneous because, in practical effect, it tends to
diminish the prosecutor's burden of proof by
implying that the prosecution need not obviate a
real or substantial doubt. [Citation omitted]
In my view, the trial court's instruction was
clearly erroneous and ought to be so declared.
In

Ireland

the

majority

affirmed

the

defendant's

conviction but noted:
We do acknowledge however, that the dissent's
criticisms of the "more weighty affairs of life"
9

language is justified and share Justice Stewart's
concern that the "possible or imaginary" language
might, by implication, be understood to diminish
the prosecutor's standard of proof. Therefore, in
our supervisory capacity, we direct the trial
courts to discontinue use of that language in their
instructions on the definition of reasonable doubt.
773 P.2d at 1380.
The

problems

discussed

in

Ireland

are

presented

foursquare by the exception that was taken in the trial court.

In

the instant case, the Defendant does not claim personal knowledge
of all of the circumstances which led to the fire. He was left to
answer

the charges

by declaring

his

innocence

and proposing

possible explanations which incorporated the circumstances as he
understood them to be. Clearly the refusal to give the "reasonable
alternative hypothesis" instruction was error where the "reasonable
doubt" instruction suggested the inadequacy of a defense based upon
"possible" explanations for the origin of the fire.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the State's alternative
fraud

theory

is

completely

persuasive evidence.

unsupported

by

any

competent

or

The Defendant was prejudiced by cross-

examination and argument calculated to establish his guilt under
such a theory.
Furthermore, the Defendant was unfairly prejudiced in
cross-examination by innuendo which was calculated to destroy his
credibility.
Finally,

the

inadequacy
10

of

the

"reasonable

doubt"

instruction would have been substantially cured had the proposed
"reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction been given and the
Defendant has preserved his right to appellate review of this issue
by exceptions taken in the trial court.
It

is

respectfully

submitted

that

the

Defendant's

convictions should be reversed and the case remanded for a new
trial.
DATED this AlAlk day of February, 1990.
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